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I. INTRODUCTION
"Arcane" might well be the adjective most frequently used to describe to
law students bodies of law that touch on constitutional interpretation. Individ-
ual rights jurisprudence is certainly no exception. In fact, grappling with theo-
ries about overarching themes, ideologies, and agendas is perhaps a more
daunting challenge to the student of individual rights law than is learning the
black letter law itself. Academics often think of this body of law as quite mal-
leable and responsive to the normative views of Justices on the Supreme Court,
and theories couched in terms of political agendas and ideological biases are
frequently offered to explain the direction in which individual rights jurispru-
dence is moving.' None of these explanations, however, contemplates the type
of interdisciplinary approach that a negligence model of individual rights law
would suggest, and few offer rational explanations for the seemingly incoherent
divergences one finds in this area of law. This Note seeks to do both.
The source of confusion at its most fundamental level that this Note, or any
other individual rights theory, must hurdle is quite simply that the individual
rights and liberties defined in the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments do
not mean what they say. As the Supreme Court has put it (at least in the case of
the Sixth Amendment), "to read th[e seemingly mandatory] language [of cer-
tain amendments] literally, it would require ' 2 unintended and extreme results.
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2003.
1. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Anti-Discrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1141
(2002) (noting that "[p]eople are pretty sure there is something going on in constitutional law these days,
but they don't know what it is"). But see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1907) ("Constitutional
questions, it is true, are not settled by even a consensus of present public opinion, for it is the peculiar
value of a written constitution that it places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative action, and
thus gives a permanence and stability to popular government which otherwise would be lacking.") (em-
phasis added).
2. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1980) (stating that the Sixth Amendment language that "the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witness against him" cannot be read literally);
see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (noting that Sixth Amendment rights are
"not absolute and may... bow to accommodate other legitimate interests"). But see Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment "guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures") (emphasis added). Note that in Bivens the reasonableness qualifier imposed by
the Fourth Amendment itself serves as a substitute for the Court's reading of various non-absolute stan-
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Moreover, these individual rights as defined in the Constitution contain no ju-
dicially manageable standards with respect to determining how literally the
language can be read. Thus, whatever the legitimacy of the Court's interposi-
tion of standards (and regardless of the legitimacy of the sources of those stan-
dards-text, tradition, historical references that perhaps shed light on "original
intent," and so forth), those standards seem inherently politically and ideologi-
cally weighted for two reasons. First, different standards have led to an alloca-
tion of disparate levels of scrutiny for the several individual rights and for the
various classes of individuals among which the Court differentiates, such as
among racial groups. Second, those various standards have tended to change
over time, as exemplified by the evolving level of scrutiny applied to classifica-
tion by gender over the last thirty years. Although these two facts about incon-
sistent judicial standards are referenced frequently in theories that explain indi-
vidual rights law in terms of political and ideological judgments made by
unelected judges, I argue that these observations can be understood as a means
of rationalizing the following basic philosophical tenet: it makes no sense to
hold a governmental actor accountable in the form of prospective relief for an
alleged harm that is not reasonably foreseeable. 3 This is the foundation of a
negligence model of individual rights law.
Building upon this foundation, the negligence model asserts that one impor-
tant way to view individual rights is from the perspective of governmental obli-
gations. Subsequent discussion will reveal that the negligence model defines
the scope of individual rights by reference to a governmental duty to avoid tak-
ing any action having a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to the means by
which a citizen performs certain duties and functions she owes to society.4 In
this manner, the negligence model takes the novel approach of defining the
dards into constitutional provisions. Additionally, although elaborate discussion of the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures is beyond the scope of this Note, it is certainly
amenable to the duty of care analysis. The impetus for such analysis lies in the recognition that protec-
tion from unreasonable searches and seizures is necessary to prevent governmental organs from com-
promising the degree of privacy necessary to the individual who organizes a radical campaign, political
or otherwise, that happens to be despised by incumbent political leaders. A proper understanding of the
fundamental underpinnings of our democratic republic suggests that such an individual, in so exercising
a controversial political voice, may well be performing a civic function. See infra text accompanying
notes 23-25 (describing civic functions).
3. Although the model set forth in this Note speaks in terms of duties owed by government and is
certainly subject to politically and ideologically charged critique, the point of the model is to make
transparent a rational means of understanding the various judicially crafted standards and disparate lev-
els of scrutiny without resorting to the language found surrounding the judicial restraint/judicial activism
divide. The fiscal conservative will likely be concerned that imposition of affirmative duties on govern-
ment can lead to "implicitly imposed.., massive [financial] obligations." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (speaking in the context of beneficiary enforcement of public law);
see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973) (indicating the Court's
clear concern with forcing changes in "spending levels"). While the model does not remove all political
elements (fiscal considerations, for instance), I do not mean to argue for judicially imposed duties on
government that would result in increasingly liberal spending or development of expensive administra-
tive programs.
4. See infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
Vol. 21:473, 2003
Duties of Care and the Constitution
scope of individual rights by reference to a certain formulation of the govern-
ment's obligations. However, the negligence model departs in certain respects
from scholarship suggesting that the government ought to ensure the precondi-
tions of effective citizenship. In essence, this Note will provoke the reader to
think about rights in a unique way. Rights are to be seen, in a negligence
model, as derivatives of duties that individuals owe to, and functions individu-
als carry out in, a larger community. Precisely, rights are to be viewed as duties
imposed upon the government to take care that means of accomplishing indi-
vidual duties and functions that benefit the larger community are not harmed.
By way of comparison, traditional rights theory discusses individual duties,
if at all, as derivatives of preexisting rights rather than as definitional elements
of the rights themselves. The scope of such preexisting rights is confined only
by reference to abstract notions such as freedom and equality. For example,
both Ronald Dworkin and Cass Sunstein suggest that rights are morally justi-
fied and must be afforded by the government irrespective of duties that may be
owed by citizens. Dworkin specifically addresses the relationship between gov-
ernmental obligations and effective citizenship in his book, Freedom's Law,
where he suggests that "the citizens of a political community govern them-
selves, in a special but valuable sense of self-government, when political action
is appropriately seen as collective action by a partnership in which all citizens
participate as free and equal partners."5 In other words, Dworkin asserts that it
is the sovereign's obligation to "treat all those subject to its dominion as equals,
that is, with equal concern." 6 Although he acknowledges the communitarian
objection to the liberal emphasis on individual rights that "neglects the respon-
sibilities that people owe to community," 7 he assumes that such criticisms take
the view that responsibilities are derived from preexisting rights. While this as-
sumption has been true traditionally, the negligence model asserts that rights
are derived from preexisting duties and social functions. Thus, when Dworkin
postulates that the Constitution requires that collective decisions reflect the
views of all members of society with equal concern by providing all individuals
the power to participate in community governance, 8 the negligence model re-
sponds by asserting that the government is only obligated to provide the power
of participation when an existing social or civic function related thereto has
been identified. Similarly, when Dworkin asserts that society must provide cer-
tain tools for effective citizenship without imposing rules other than moral re-
5. Ronald Dworkin, The Partnership Conception of Democracy, 86 CAL. L. REV. 453, 453 (1998)
(emphasis added).
6. Ronald Dworkin, Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog's Approach, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 251
(2001).
7. Id. at 252.
8. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
1-38 (1996).
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straints on behavior harmful to others, 9 the negligence model responds by sug-
gesting that maybe society only provides those tools in contexts where they
foreseeably will be utilized so as to constitute effective citizenship, however
that term is ultimately defined.
Similarly, Cass Sunstein defends a conceptualization of rights under an an-
ticaste principle, which "forbids social and legal practices from translating
highly visible and morally irrelevant differences into systemic"'1 inequality in
rights treatment that is not justified from a moral point of view. Sunstein thus
suggests that rights are afforded without reference to duties or functions of in-
dividual citizens, and, to the extent such duties or functions may exist, they are
derivatives of preexisting rights. Under Sunstein's model, failure to perform
any such derivative duties does not constitute moral justification for systemati-
cally unequal treatment. As with Dworkin's conception, however, these argu-
ments fail to place the defining scope of rights into a framework that is func-
tional without resorting to amorphous notions of moral justification. The
negligence model, while having its own ambiguities, refuses to look at moral
justifications to legitimate the government's unequal treatment of some citi-
zens. Rather, as will be illustrated, the negligence model justifies unequal
treatment so long as unequal functions or duties are expected, and contextual
norms provide the framework for ascertaining those expectations, at least in ex
post analysis.
Amy Gutmann gets as close as any rights theorist to the negligence model
conception of the relationship between rights and duties. Within the context of
religious freedom, she suggests that the relationship between rights and duties
is one of "two-way protection."' 1 "[T]he right of religious citizens to advance
political arguments in terms that are religiously based carries with it a responsi-
bility ... to strive for reciprocity." 12 Again, Gutmann derives the responsibility
to strive for reciprocity from the preexisting right. The negligence model, on
the other hand, suggests that, if Gutmann's identified responsibility is taken to
be the social or civic function that makes religious freedom good for society
(which is by no means the claim), then, whenever society silences religious
speech that does not accomplish reciprocity in public discourse, society should
not be expected to foresee or prevent any compromise of religious freedom
(since the exercise thereof is not undertaken to advance the greater social
good).
Dworkin, Sunstein, and Gutmann each advance rights theories consistent
9. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 211-85
(2000).
10. Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411 (1994).
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with the traditional focus upon what individuals ought to do with the rights that
government has a duty to afford them, but a fundamental method of under-
standing the scope of the rights themselves is lost with this approach. By deriv-
ing the limit to rights from what individuals ought to do with them, the tradi-
tional approach engages in an analytically hazier business than establishing a
standard by which to gauge the scope of the governmental duty that gives rise
to the right. For purposes of the negligence model, the ultimate goal is to un-
derstand the precise scope of government's duty to protect rights. The answer,
says the negligence model, lies in the aforementioned philosophical tenet-it
makes no sense to hold a governmental actor accountable in the form of pro-
spective relief for an alleged harm that is not reasonably foreseeable-and this
is best understood by analogy to tort law. However, because the rights at issue
are individual, the negligence model must concern itself with the foreseeability
of harm to the individual's means of carrying out her social or civic function-
i.e., her package of broadly defined morally or legally imposed duties to the
greater society-rather than foreseeability of harm to the collective directly.13
The task of molding all relevant pieces of individual rights law into a negli-
gence model form far exceeds the scope of this Note. Thus, this Note will dis-
cuss, sometimes briefly, various landmark cases and doctrines from a variety of
segments of individual rights law in the hope of providing a broad framework
for thinking about individual rights questions in terms of the negligence model.
This Note in no way purports to offer a "better" or "best" way to look at indi-
vidual rights jurisprudence. Rather, my desire is to provide a unique lens
through which to view individual rights law; to provide an additional analytical
tool to add to a vast array of such tools that presently exist in individual rights
scholarship. In particular, by speaking in terms of duties owed by the govern-
ment, the negligence model makes transparent a rational conceptualization of
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence without resorting to language surrounding
the judicial restraint/judicial activism divide. This transparency that a negli-
gence model analysis lends to the study of cases, especially those that have
fallen into disrepute, is a tremendous strength of the model because it identifies
some of the unspoken normative assumptions that underlie the justification of
those holdings.
These strengths notwithstanding, some of the Supreme Court's current ju-
risprudence, particularly in the context of affirmative action, 14 does not fit the
model without significant molding. Yet, "one reason to come up with new theo-
retical terms is in order to manipulate them."' 5 Where appropriate, this Note
13. Cf DAVID LYONS, RIGHTS, WELFARE, AND MILL'S MORAL THEORY 47-79 (1994) (discussing
John Stuart Mill and the notion that collective utility may be a primary criterion for determining right
and wrong).
14. See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
15. E-mail from Jack M. Balkin, Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment,
Yale Law School (Nov. 1, 2001, 08:52:25 EST) (on file with author).
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will undertake and clearly identify such manipulation.
The Note begins by setting forth the framework of the negligence model.
Part II discusses tort doctrine that is useful in understanding individual rights
law under a negligence model. Part III applies the model to equal protection
cases, including racial discrimination, affirmative action cases, and non-suspect
classifications like sexual orientation. Part III concludes with an application of
the negligence model to the shifting scrutiny pertaining to sex discrimination,
which is taken up at the end of the equal protection discussion because of its
distinct emphasis on evolutionary patterns in doctrine. Part IV briefly discusses
due process cases, with an emphasis on economic due process and abortion
rights. Finally, Part V considers the heightened scrutiny applied in free speech
cases and reasons for this unique treatment. The point of departure for each
analysis lies in a thorough understanding of negligence and duties of care.
II. FRAMEWORK OF THE NEGLIGENCE MODEL
Laying the framework for a negligence model of individual rights law be-
gins with a proper understanding of tort law.1 6 For purposes of this model, I
will begin with the familiar tort case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.17 In
Palsgraf, then-Judge Cardozo held that a negligent act with respect to a particu-
lar individual that directly resulted in bodily harm to a different individual "was
not a wrong in its relation to the" latter.18 In fact, Palsgraf equates the proxi-
mate cause question to that of the existence of a duty of care with respect to a
particular class of plaintiffs. 19 In other words, injury is not sufficient to consti-
tute a wrong. Rather, there must be a foreseeable risk of invading the legally
recognized rights of the class of citizens that is harmed. That is, negligence, be-
ing the breach of a duty of care, only exists when a duty of care is owed to a
16. Although this Note asserts that a duty of care view of tort law is "proper" in the context of
developing the negligence model of individual rights law, I mean to pass no judgment on what
constitutes a proper view of tort law in and of itself. Compare Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, To-
ward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (stating that liability is best
assigned to the party "in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and
accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made")(emphasis omitted) and GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1970) (setting forth a rich analysis of a transaction cost
understanding of tort law), with JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001) (constructing
an epistemic argument for understanding tort law as a conception of corrective justice).
17. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). The plaintiff in Palsgraf had been standing on a train platform when
another man ran to catch a departing train and leapt for the train. The man dropped a package of fire-
works as a guard pulled him into the train. The package exploded, causing station scales to fall and
strike the plaintiff.
18. Id. at 99.
19. Id. at 511 ("The Palsgraf decision calls into question the relationship between the duty of care
and proximate causation. When a defendant has no notice of the dangerous conditions created by a third
party, it may be said that there is no negligence at all."). However, some scholars read Palsgraf to ad-
dress proximate cause as a question separate from the question of negligence. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 501-11 (7th ed. 2000) (placing the case in its discussion of
proximate cause).
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particular class of individuals. A corollary to this proposition is that society will
not assign a duty to a potential defendant to guard against a harm to a class of
individuals when the risk of the harm is not reasonably foreseeable, because the
defendant simply cannot guard against that which is unforeseeable. Moreover,
Cardozo notes that certain actions are so risky as to broaden the class with re-
spect to whom harm is reasonably foreseeable to the point of "impos[ing] a
duty of [care] not far from" being owed to the whole world.20 Since the negli-
gence model of individual rights law speaks of individual rights in terms of du-
ties owed to particular classes, the foregoing propositions constitute the funda-
mental principles that permit the Court to treat different classes of rights and
different classes of individuals differently.
The negligence model of individual rights speaks in terms of duties of care
owed by "someone" to a specific class of "somebodies." Therefore, it is neces-
sary to convert conventional rights rhetoric into duty language. 21 I will begin
this conversion of rhetoric by borrowing from communitarian descriptions of
the relationship between the state and its citizen. The most basic proposition
underlying this relationship is that the citizens' performance of certain duties is
a prerequisite for the proper functioning of the state. In fact, the health of a so-
ciety is largely based on its networks of trust and civic obligation.22 Thus, the
Supreme Court has indicated correctly that the government has no duty to cre-
ate incentives for "the performance of a public duty it is already owed.,
23
Moreover, it is clear that the state does, and must, provide its citizens with
rights, which are often described in terms of individual freedoms and liberties.
The question then arises, why does the Constitution, in providing such individ-
ual rights, impose upon the government duties to provide freedom for individu-
24als to engage in certain behavior such as political expression, which might
not, in the strictest sense, be considered a mandatory civic obligation? The an-
swer, under the negligence model, is that the Constitution does not create pure
freedom for any behavior, but merely provides the means for exercising what I
20. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 100 (citing Jeremiah Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability-Suggested
Changes in Classification 11, 30 HARV. L. REV. 319, 328 (1917), and 1 THOMAS ATKINS STREET,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY: A PRESENTATION OF THE THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
COMMON LAW 77-78 (1906)). Although Cardozo was referring to absolute liability, which this Note
does not consider explicitly, the principle is important to the model insofar as it suggests that activities
potentially involving certain types of harm (to be defined as compromises in the means of exercising
civic functions), potentially restricting the type of free political speech vital to the legitimacy of a de-
mocratic republic for example, may require the imposition of broader and more stringent duties of care.
21. See John Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in RELATING TO
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORt ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 111, 111 (Peter Cane &
John Gardner eds., 2001) ("[T]here is nothing that counts as the violation of a right other than a failure
to perform (one or more of) the obligations that it grounds.").
22. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing notions of "social capital").
23. See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588 (1973) (referring to the mandatory civic duty
of testifying as a material witness).
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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will call civic functions, which are those mandatory and permissive duties that
certain members of a democracy must perform in order for it to function prop-
erly (including those things traditionally considered mandatory civic obliga-
tions).25 In other words, the Constitution, insofar as it embodies provisions of
individual rights, actually imposes upon the government and its agents a duty to
take care that the means of performing civic functions, which in turn are duties
26owed by individuals to the state, are adequately protected. Here we have the
27
basis for transforming rights rhetoric into duty talk.
Having laid the foundation, there still remains the matter of properly ex-
plaining the notion of civic functions and distinguishing it from traditional un-
derstandings of civic obligations. Civic functions under the negligence model
are not limited to mandatory civic duties such as jury duty or military service
under the draft. Rather, to accommodate spectrums of individual rights stan-
dards (defined in terms of duties) that permit variation across classes of indi-
viduals and rights and over time, civic functions must entail all of those manda-
tory and permissive duties that certain members of a democracy must perform
in order for a governed society, considering all contemporary circumstances, to
function properly. Thus, civic functions include those duties we, as members of
a governed society, feel socially, morally, or politically obligated to perform.
Civic functions also encompass those duties about which we recognize the need
for someone to feel socially, morally, or politically obligated to perform. For
example, they include those duties, perhaps voting or publicly voicing one's
politically or morally based support for a judicial nominee, that give the per-
former a "warm glow," those duties that if made mandatory or compensated
would make the performer "feel like [he has] prostituted [himself]. 28
Thus having transformed rights rhetoric into duty speech, it makes sense to
acknowledge the viability of rights as protections only insofar as they protect
25. Thus, for example, considering society and its contemporary circumstances, something as un-
duty-like (in a conventional sense) as maintaining a healthy and private family life may be a civic func-
tion if the normative argument prevails that such is necessary for the rearing of socially and politically
productive offspring.
26. On first glance, Hurtado may seem to problematize this proposition insofar as it imposes a
mandatory civic duty on a non-citizen. See Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 579, 588. However, upon consideration
of the equal protection line of cases that extend certain rights to non-citizens, it becomes apparent that
Hurtado actually strengthens the proposition that the scope of rights owed by a state might be defined by
reference to the scope of duties owed by the individual, and vice-versa.
27. Note that this conversion of rights rhetoric into duty speech is analogous to arguments suggest-
ing that, within a governed society, individual freedom can only be achieved by mutual restraint. See
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SC. 1243, 1248 (1968) ("When men mutually agreed
to pass laws against robbing, mankind became more free, not less so .... [O]nce they see the necessity
of mutual coercion, they become free to pursue other goals."). For a comprehensive discussion of the
importance of various forms of "'law-talk' that shape conversations within and concerning [constitu-
tional] law," see generally J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Canons and Constitutional
Thought, in LEGAL CANONS 400, 402 (J.M Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000). Consistent with the
Balkin and Levinson discussion, this Note seeks to provide a new perspective that the various audiences
for whom "canon[s are] constructed" can use to evaluate those canons. See id.
28. Robert C. Ellickson, Lecture at Yale Law School (Feb. 5, 2002).
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the means necessary for performing a civic function. For instance, one might
say that a certain minimum level of education is necessary for effective voting
or service as a juror and thus accord a right to limited education.29 As such,
rights become no more than duties of care imposed upon government and its
agents to prevent certain harms to classes the risk of which is reasonably fore-
seeable.30 Those harms, in turn, can be defined as compromises to the means of
performing civic functions.31 In other words, if one considers rights as deriva-
tions of the mandatory and permissive obligations of citizenship (civic func-
tions), governmental organs will only be expected to foresee potential obstruc-
tions to rights that are exercised in a way conducive to carrying out such
individual civic functions (I call this the performance of civic functions). The
duty of care the Constitution places on government, as interpreted by the Court,
is to prevent foreseeable risks, and the only risks foreseeable are those that ob-
struct the performance of civic functions. The Court's vocabulary for discuss-
ing this duty includes such terms as "rational relations," "intermediate scru-
tiny," and "strict scrutiny."
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The equal protection line of cases evidences great amenability to a negli-
gence model of individual rights jurisprudence. While racial classification, af-
firmative action, non-suspect classifications, and intermediate scrutiny cases
are all relevant, an introductory discussion of one particular equal protection
case will provide the proper motivation for subsequent discussion. In fact, Jus-
tice Powell's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in San Antonio In-
29. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (suggesting that, al-
though there is no fundamental right to education generally, there may be a fundamental right to "an
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of
full participation in the political process") (emphasis added).
30. Reasonable foreseeability language, while not often employed in cases construing the scope of
individual rights, is widely used in cases involving constitutional torts. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) ("[A] qualified immunity [defense will] be defeated if an official 'knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took.., would violate the constitutional rights of the
[plaintiff] .... ') (citation omitted). Note that the quote from Harlow is suggestive of duties owed to
particular classes of potential plaintiffs, which parallels Palsgrafs rationale.
31. Considerable support for the Court's unmentioned sensitivity to this particular type of harm
when it qualifies as a breach of a duty owed by the government can be inferred from Federal Election
Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). The plaintiffs in that case, a group of voters seeking to com-
pel the FEC to treat an organization as a political committee and enforce applicable disclosure require-
ments, overcame the generalized grievance hurdle to standing largely because of the civic-function-
nature of the right to information at issue in the case. See id., at 24-25 ("[T]he informational injury at
issue here, directly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and spe-
cific such that the fact that it is widely shared does not deprive Congress of constitutional power to au-
thorize its vindication in the federal courts."). A comparison with Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984),
reveals the significance of the Court's emphasis on the political nature of the "right" in Akins. At its
broadest, Allen v. Wright might stand for the proposition that standing will generally be denied for
breach of a duty owed to the general public (as opposed to a particular class), especially when it takes
any degree of creativity to trace the alleged harm to the breach. See id.
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dependent School District v. Rodriguez32 mirrors precisely the nature and thrust
of a negligence model of individual rights. Although couched in terms of "fun-
damental rights," Rodriguez holds that an equal protection violation exists un-
der a state sponsored regime of disparate funding of public schools only if it
can fairly be said that "the system fails to provide each child with an opportu-
nity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process."33 If it can be
fairly said that disparate treatment in a state-sponsored system of education
does lead to these results, then harm to the means of performing civic functions
(which include participation in the political process) will be reasonably fore-
seeable, thereby defining the duty of care for state actors with respect to the
prejudiced class. 34 Moreover, the Rodriguez Court explicitly stated that "the
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages," 35 which, although nothing more than a truism, is among the ele-
ments that motivate the discussion of the negligence model.36
The Court's equal protection jurisprudence involves many more standards
than those at issue in Rodriguez, and it remains to be seen just how such stan-
dards as the rational basis doctrine, and intermediate and strict scrutiny fit into
the negligence model. As a general proposition, under equal protection prece-
dent, statutes that directly impair the exercise of a civic function (like voting) or
that discriminate against groups or classes that have been prevented from exer-
cising civic functions in the past-such as race-based suspect classifica-
tions 37-are subjected to strict scrutiny,38 while non-suspect classifications
must merely have a rational basis to pass constitutional muster.39 In this re-
spect, the dependence of heightened scrutiny (or of the existence and scope of a
duty of care on governmental agents) upon prior treatment of classes provides
for evolution over time of duties of care and thus of the level of scrutiny ap-
plied under the negligence model. The reader will note that if the negligence
32. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
33. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
34. But cf PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 857 (4th ed. 2000) (stating, in its discussion of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
that the Equal Protection Clause requires "the most stringent test of intention," and questioning why a
negligence standard should not apply).
35. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24 (footnote omitted).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
37. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
38. To speak in terms of the reasonable foreseeability of risks of harm, the Court recognizes that
certain discrimination has a high risk of impairing the exercise of civic functions if, for example, there is
past history of such discrimination or if the statute overtly states the risk of discrimination against exer-
cise of civic functions. As a result, the Court will hold those statutes to strict scrutiny, which is usually
fatal. But see Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (O'Connor, J.) (applying strict scru-
tiny to a racial classification that benefits minorities).
39. See City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (holding that "legisla-
tion that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose").
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model is properly applied with regard to defining minimal constitutional stan-
dards of care, then a past history of deprivation of the means of exercising civic
functions should not exist with regard to any class. The response lies in evolv-
ing social and political norms that inform the Court regarding the degree of rea-
sonable foresight to be expected of government.4 °
Since the history of the Court's treatment of racial classifications provides
an outstanding illustration of the way in which evolving norms change reason-
able foresight expectation, the equal protection discussion below begins with an
analysis of racial classifications. Affirmative action, being closely related to ra-
cial classifications and representing another step in the evolutionary process, is
discussed immediately after racial classifications. Next, non-suspect classifica-
tions are analyzed. Finally, rounding out the various levels of scrutiny applied
by the courts, this Note closes its equal protection discussion with an analysis
of intermediate scrutiny, distinctly emphasizing the application of the negli-
gence model to the evolutionary process of shifting levels of equal protection
scrutiny.
A. Racial Classifications
The modem Supreme Court applies its most stringent equal protection scru-
tiny to many racial classifications. However, the Court has been far more defer-
ential in prior eras. The following discussion emphasizes, in terms of the negli-
gence model of individual rights, three landmark cases in the evolution of equal
protection jurisprudence in the areas of overt racial discrimination and dis-
criminatory effects.
The path from Plessy v. Ferguson4 1 to Brown v. Board of Education42 illus-
trates the evolving foreseeability of risk of harm to the means of exercising
civic functions with respect to well-defined classes of individuals. In Plessy,
40. Recall that the negligence model does not do away with these issues that often form the basis
for theories of less precisely structured constitutional jurisprudence, but merely seeks to offer a model
which rationalizes the seemingly arcane array of cases that may or may not rely upon social or political
norms in some form or another. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
41. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Prior to the adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, un-
der which Plessy was decided, Chief Justice Taney ruled in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393, 451 (1857), that even if a black person could properly sue in federal court, "the right of property in
a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution," and that statutes compromising this right
would be struck down. However, the Court ultimately decided that Scott, as a black person, was not a
state "citizen" and therefore did not have standing to sue. Id. at 407. This holding illustrates and is ana-
lytically "justified" under the negligence model by the view that slaves were expected to perform virtu-
ally no independent civic functions. Thus, it would take a tremendous showing to demonstrate a consti-
tutional wrong stemming from a harm to the means of exercising civic functions, or that such risk could
reasonably have been foreseen. Here, the assumption that slaves contributed little civic function value
underlying the negligence model analysis, not the negligence model itself, analytically "justifies" the
result in Plessy. In this way, the negligence model demonstrates its strength in identifying the often hid-
den assumptions that underlie the justification of problematic holdings. Of course, I do not assert that
such an underlying assumption is legitimate or morally justifies the result in Plessy.
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the Court held that a "statute which implies merely a legal distinction between
the white and colored races has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the
two races" and therefore does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment.43 Most
scholars today take issue with this rationale, even when considered from the
perspective of then-contemporary social and political circumstances, and per-
haps even more so under those conditions. In any event, although many would
prefer the ring of Justice Harlan's "color-blindness" approach, 4  Justice
Brown's opinion in Plessy sounds in civic function talk that is consistent with
the negligence model. In particular, Justice Brown emphasized that "separate
but equal" laws create distinctions that amount to "social, as distinguished from
political" inequalities.45 One might read Plessy as recognizing that no civic
benefit could be had at the time from commingling the races in certain social
settings under then-contemporary circumstances and norms-for example,
great tension and potentially violent confrontations from what may have been
seen by many as forced commingling. Under this view, no harm to the per-
formance of either race's civic functions was reasonably foreseeable to gov-
ernmental actors imposing separate but equal classifications.46 Thus, with re-
spect to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court applied rational basis scrutiny to
separate but equal racial classifications.47
From Plessy, the road to Brown is often described in terms of chipping
away at the separate but equal doctrine.48 A discussion of the cases49 that un-
43. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543.
44. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor toler-
ates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.").
45. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
46. Cf DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S
THIRD CENTURY 41 (2d ed. 1998) ("The Justices [in Plessy] were not approving of apartheid, but merely
saying that the Constitution did not clearly prohibit this form of state action.").
47. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550 ("So far... as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned,
the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute... is a reasonable regulation, and with respect
to this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature.") (emphasis added). Cf
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 144 (1893) ("[M]uch which will seem unconstitutional to one man... may reasonably not
seem so to another ... the constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion,
but leaves open this range of choice.").
48. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 342-46 (7th ed. 1998).
49. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding uncon-
stitutional the maintenance of segregated classrooms and libraries in a graduate program at a state uni-
versity); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (holding that maintaining a separate state law
school for black students was unconstitutional, in part because it compromised the students' ability to
study with racial groups that will make up the bulk of "lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other offi-
cials"); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, no court
could enforce a racially restrictive property covenant); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948)
(striking down state failure to educate black citizens); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (stating that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are imme-
diately suspect"); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that inability to at-
tend a particular state law school, even though that state would provide financial aid for the student to
attend an out of state law school, was on its face unequal); cf Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
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dercut the separate but equal doctrine and ultimately led to its death is relevant
to the negligence model. Yet, even more important are the changes in social
and political environments that led to the heightened awareness of risks that
might jeopardize African Americans' ability to carry out their increasingly rec-
ognized civic functions.
The shift toward a recognition of African Americans' civic functions
probably began with the migration of blacks out of the South, "the core of ra-
cial discrimination.., on both the public and private level.",50 Recognition of
African American contributions could not occur in places that sometimes
barely recognized them as human beings. World War II was also of utmost im-
portance since its onset "witnessed many blacks fighting side by side with
whites and saw increasing migration of blacks northward," 51 and led to height-
ened awareness of the African American contribution to the United States. Spe-
cifically, President Truman, aware of the military contributions of African
Americans during World War II, banned "'separate but equal' recruiting, train-
ing, and service in the armed forces."52 Truman, also recognizing the workplace
contributions of African Americans, issued executive orders aimed at eliminat-
ing racial employment discrimination. 53 These executive actions evidenced a
growing recognition of the African American need for and ability to perform
civic functions in the form of military service and gainful employment.54
As this history suggests, the 1940s and early 1950s saw a heightened
awareness of the equality of African Americans' civic functions to those per-
formed by white Americans. As a result, Brown can be read as a (perhaps lag-
ging) judicial response to the shift in foreseeability of harm to the exercise of
African Americans' civic functions (and other underrepresented races). Brown
overruled Plessy and stated that "segregation of children in public schools
solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangi-
ble' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal
education opportunities." 55 The Court drew on language from McLaurin v.
(invalidating a state law requiring segregation in residential communities in order to prevent cross-
breeding); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (striking down under the Fifteenth Amendment
a state literacy test with a grandfather clause used as a prerequisite to voting).
50. ABRAHAM PERRY, supra note 48, at 333 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE NEws 5 (Oct. 23,
1970)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 334 (citing Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948)).
53. E.g., Exec. Order No. 10,308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Dec. 6, 1951); Exec. Order No. 9980, 13
Fed. Reg. 4311 (July 28, 1948).
54. While a comprehensive analysis of the history that gave birth to a general and growing aware-
ness of African American civic, political, and moral responsibilities is beyond the scope of this Note, the
foregoing sketch of some of that history demonstrates the proposition that shifting norms and social
structures can outline changes in civic functions of particular classes, and thus may lead to reconceptu-
alizations of the foreseeability of risks of constitutional harms to those classes.
55. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (holding the same under the Fifth Amendment as it governs in the District of Columbia).
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Oklahoma State Regents56 that emphasizes the student's "ability to study, to
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general,
to learn his profession." 57 Recall that the later Rodriguez case similarly empha-
sized the need to "provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process."58 The language in Brown may be under-
stood as defining the scope of the state's duty to provide certain minimal means
of performing civic functions (such as political participation and gainful em-
ployment) with respect to underrepresented classes.
In addition to the kind of overt discrimination in Brown, the Supreme Court
has entertained discriminatory effects arguments by individuals who claim to
have been discriminated against by the application of an ostensibly race-neutral
statute. Within the context of modem racially discriminatory impacts, if a dis-
criminatory effect is incidental and not purposeful, the Court may find that the
risk of discrimination was not foreseeable to the governmental body, and thus
will not subject the statute to strict scrutiny. For example, Washington v.
Davis59 upheld the use of a personnel test that operated to reject a dispropor-
tionate number of African-American applicants to the District of Columbia po-
lice department.60 The Court noted that an official act does not trigger strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause "solely because it has a racially dis-
proportionate impact.,' 61 Given the Court's emphasis on the rationality of test-
ing verbal skills for a "job [that] requires special ability to communicate orally
and in writing, ''62 Davis can be read for the proposition that when government
seeks to employ high caliber public servants (who in a sense undertake to per-
form a level of heightened "civic function" themselves), it may employ reason-
able methods of separating the wheat from the chaff. In other words, given the
nature of the task at hand, the Court recognizes that it is not reasonable to im-
pose a duty to foresee and prevent risk of harm to even suspect classes because
government could not function properly if it were under a duty to foresee all
disparate impacts totally unrelated to the governmental objective at issue. 6' The
56. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
57. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (citation omitted).
58. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (emphasis added).
59. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
60. The court below held the statute unconstitutional because a far greater proportion of African
Americans than whites failed the personnel test and the defendants had not shown the test to be an ade-
quate measure ofjob performance. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (1975).
61. Id. at 239.
62. Id. at 246.
63. Note that this argument parallels the reasons for imposing a reasonable duty of care upon de-
fendants in tort suits. Forcing such individuals or entities to foresee remote risks would halt the proper
functioning of everyday life. Cf., e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting the argument
that the Baldus study findings of disparate death penalty sentences for defendants charged with killing
white victims as opposed to blacks should trigger heightened scrutiny). With respect to McCleskey, note
the degree of attenuation to which one would have to go to argue that a disparate impact in the sentenc-
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apparently inconsistent treatment of the minority groups in Plessy, Brown, and
Davis is thus reconciled by an analysis of the evolving foreseeability of risk of
harm to the means of exercising civic functions. This method of reconciliation
permits the use of a single framework, the negligence model, to explain diamet-
rically opposed cases (Plessy and Brown) by simply substituting the foresee-
ability variable.
B. Affirmative Action
Since tort law imposes duties of care that vary depending upon the victim's
situation and the foreseeability of harm to the class of similarly situated vic-
tims, if the foreseeability of constitutional harm to a particular class increases,
courts must revisit the government's duty under a negligence model. At times
this may arguably require affirmative action. 64 Once applied, the negligence
model is useful in understanding this area of constitutional law because it ex-
plains the rationality of treating various classes favorably to limited extents that
vary based on time, location, and other factors. Nevertheless, the application of
the negligence model to affirmative action case law requires significant mold-
ing. For this reason, after setting forth a theoretical background, I limit the dis-
cussion of affirmative action case law to a single illustrative case and suggest
that the negligence model, while providing a unique and valuable lens through
which to view the existing jurisprudence, is perhaps best reserved for argu-
ments advocating for change in the existing law.
The argument that there is a need to treat different groups differently, or
even the same groups differently in times of changed social and political con-
text, is not novel. However, most discourse on this issue stems from an assump-
tion that there is an ideal and constant moral duty, however defined, to treat
groups equally (either in the sense of equal opportunity or equal result), and
changes in the actual course of treatment reflect only the changed circum-
stances and not changed duties of equal treatment. For instance:
Those who carry the civil rights vision to its ultimate conclusion see no great differ-
ence between promoting equality of opportunity and equality of results. If there are
not equal results among groups presumed to have equal genetic potential, then some
inequality of opportunity must have intervened somewhere, and the question of pre-
cisely where is less important than the remedy of restoring the less fortunate to their
just position.
6 5
ing of a convicted murderer with respect not to the convict herself, but her victim, presents a reasonably
foreseeable risk of harm to the convict's means of exercising her civic functions.
64. A thorough understanding of the place for affirmative action programs in the negligence model
is another note topic in and of itself.
65. THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 42 (1984). But see Regents of the
Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.) (noting that broadly stated societal dis-
crimination is too malleable a "concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past," thus im-
plying that the question of how the inequality occurred is extremely important because it demonstrates
the concreteness of the injury). See generally Patricia Williams, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARv. L. REV. 525, 542 (1990) (noting the criticism of af-
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In a negligence model, however, the question of "precisely where" is vitally
important because it defines the degree of changed foreseeability of constitu-
tional harm and thus defines the scope of change in the underlying duty itself.
Therefore, social and political context, although vitally relevant, is relevant
only because of its precise nexus with foreseeability of harm, and thus the defi-
nitional duty itself. The following case discussion will illuminate this point. 66
The Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.67 disallowed a
city council plan requiring general contractors working on city contracts to
subcontract thirty percent of the contract to businesses owned and controlled by
minority group members, defined as "citizens of the United States who are
Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." 68 Although
the plan purported to remedy the effects of prior discrimination, "[t]here was no
direct evidence of race discrimination on the part of the city in letting contracts
or any evidence that the city's prime contractors had discriminated., 69 The
Court noted that the states have no affirmative power under the Fourteenth
Amendment and must accordingly undertake remedial measures only if "in ac-
cordance with" the Equal Protection Clause. 70 It further stated that "if the city
could show that it had essentially become a 'passive participant' in a system of
racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry,
[clearly] the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system."
7 1
The problem with this plan, according to the Court, was the lack of any connec-
tion with an identifiable history of wrongdoing.
72
The negligence model views the problem with the affirmative action pro-
gram in Croson similarly. Assuming the facts and discussion of the case, the
lack of an identifiable history of wrongdoing signals a lack of concrete and
firmative action programs designed to foster a sense of equality that "a corrupt system of favoritism see-
sawing between 'the deserving' and 'the preferred,' caters to an assumption that those who are included
by the grace of affirmative action systems are therefore undeserving"). The Supreme Court's treatment
of affirmative action by state actors undercuts the view of those civil rights advocates noted by Sowell,
thus suggesting that something else is going on in the Court's jurisprudence. In fact, "the Supreme
Court's willingness sometimes to allow affirmative action by state actors has been premised upon a
backward-looking approach, justifying affirmative action as a remedy for past discrimination against
African Americans; the Court has treated past discrimination very narrowly." FARBER ET AL., supra note
46, at 244 (citing PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)).
66. This affirmative action discussion speaks of action by state actors, and this language, by virtue
of the negligence model's structure, must be transformed into duty talk. See supra text accompanying
notes 21-27. Therefore, I tread lightly because I do not wish it to be interpreted that the negligence
model necessarily supports expanding the welfare state or imposing any additional significant fiscal
burdens on the government. In fact, the model, insofar as it speaks of requiring a minimum means for the
exercise of civic functions, as in the Rodriguez case, see supra note 58 and accompanying text, might
well be read for the opposite proposition.
67. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
68. Id. at 487 (O'Connor, J.) (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 480.
70. Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 492.
72. Cf supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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substantial change in the foreseeability of risk of constitutional harm with re-
spect to the city's minority groups. Because the Court required the remedial
scheme to be made according to the Equal Protection Clause, the Court essen-
tially held that the city had not rationalized an increased duty of care-
particularly not one placed on independent contractors-since it had not shown
any concrete increase in foreseeability with respect to risk.73 Here, because the
duty is placed on a private subcontractor, it makes sense to presume such
schemes invalid unless the standards of the negligence model are met by dem-
onstrating changes in foreseeability of harm prior to imposition of the height-
ened standard. In a sense, it is something of a reverse approach, but one that
Justice O'Connor supports by mentioning the political majority African Ameri-
cans held on the city council.74 As this application of the negligence model to
Croson illustrates, foreseeability of harm is at least partially derived from social
and political context, thereby rationally justifying the favorable treatment of
certain classes to a limited extent based on time, location, and other factors.
C. Non-Suspect Classes
With respect to statutes that potentially discriminate against non-suspect
classes, such as those defined by mental illness 75 and sexual orientation, 76 the
Court applies a relaxed rational basis standard, which requires only that the
classification bear some rational link to a legitimate governmental objective.
Since the government can raise any legitimate objective when defending
against a rational basis challenge, challenged statutes are rarely overturned.
However, in exceptional cases, the Court departs from its typical deference to
find statutes devoid of any sufficiently rational nexus to a legitimate govern-
mental objective. As discussed below, the negligence model explains both the
typical deferential and the more stringent versions of rational basis review in
terms of the risk of impairing the performance of non-suspect classes' civic
functions. Deferential rational basis review suggests that the Court does not
perceive substantial risk, while more stringent rational basis review might mark
the beginning of a shift in judicial views of the duties owed to and from certain
73. This case also presents difficulty under the negligence model because the civic function of pro-
ductive work has a tenuous connection to obtaining government contracts. However, this speaks to the
foreseeability of the risk of compromising the means by which one performs such a civic function. This
interpretation cuts against the negligence model insofar as the case held for J.A. Croson Co., a non-
minority contractor, but for the negligence model in that the invalidity of the affirmative action program
rested on its inconsistency with the objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.
74. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 495. Since the negligence model stresses the ability to perform
civic functions, including the exercise of political voice, the minority group's political majority counsels
against finding heightened foreseeability of harm.
75. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) ("To withstand equal
protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be ra-
tionally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.").
76. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that criminalizing homosexual sodomy
because of its immorality is constitutional under rational basis review).
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non-suspect classes. The following discussion focuses upon a single case, Ro-
mer v. Evans,77 the majority and dissenting opinions of which illustrate duty-
based rationales for both the deferential and more stringent versions of rational
basis review.
Under the negligence model, subjecting non-suspect classes to deferential
rational basis review evidences the Court's view that governmental bodies do
not owe any extra duty of care to such particular classes78 because the risk to
these classes of obstructing the exercise of civic functions is unforeseeable (or
quite low). For instance, Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans,79 which
would have upheld a provision of the Colorado Constitution that prohibited the
adoption or enforcement of any statute, regulation, or policy that accords mi-
nority or protected status to the homosexual class on the basis of homosexual
behavior or relationships, placed considerable emphasis on the view that "those
who engage in homosexual conduct tend to... have high disposable income
[and] possess political power much greater than their numbers." 80 In other
words, the dissent in Evans seems to acknowledge that if persuaded that a cer-
tain class is shown to adequately perform civic functions such- as exercising
significant political power without special governmental protection, the dis-
senters may not see fit to impose on governmental agents any extra duty of
care.
The majority in Evans employed a more stringent version of rational basis
review to strike down the state constitutional provision, because the majority
thought that the provision was irrational and motivated by animus. This use of
what has been called "rational basis with teeth ' 81 might, under a negligence
model, analytically suggest the beginning of a shift in the Court's view on du-
ties owed to and from the homosexual class. 82 However, for the time being, the
only plausible negligence model application to the area of deferential homo-
sexual class equal protection jurisprudence 83 demonstrates that the Court, pos-
sibly for reasons similar to those evidenced in Justice Scalia's dissent in Evans,
77. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Note that Evans is only one case in a large and complex body of law.
78. Recall Cardozo's discussion of foreseeable risk to particular classes in tort law. See supra notes
16-20 and accompanying text.
79. 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 645-46.
81. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Dis-
course and Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1327, 1383, 1405-06 (2000) (iden-
tifying "Evans' more scrutinizing version of rational basis" and suggesting that the Court, while being
informed by social norms, can also push those norms in a "step-by-step" fashion so long as the appear-
ance of giving a "promotion" to a particular class is limited). Professor Eskridge distinguishes rational
basis with teeth from general rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, under which
"[s]peculative thinking... satisfie[s]" the test. Id. at 1383.
82. 1 make no moral judgment in this Note about the types of civic functions that should be ex-
pected from or permitted of the homosexual class. Rather, my purpose in discussing this topic is merely
to address a case that illustrates a tension between the majority and dissenting positions as it relates to
the normative assumptions underlying a negligence model interpretation.
83. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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has determined that the risk of harm to the performance of civic functions is
relatively small with respect to the homosexual class.
84
D. Intermediate Scrutiny
Intermediate scrutiny suggests a shift in the Court's jurisprudence regarding
duties of care to classes of individuals that are increasingly taking on more
civic functions. However, note that the Court's response is often delayed. For
instance, in an 1874 case dealing with voting rights, the Supreme Court held
that states were not prohibited from leaving "that important trust to men
alone." 85 Under a negligence interpretation, this decision is a reflection of the
negligible role the Court perceived women to have in the exercise of civic func-
tions.
86
Beginning with the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, the twentieth century
brought significant normative changes regarding the civic functions women
could, and should, perform. 87 In 1973, the Court recognized that it could no
longer apply rational basis review to sex discrimination in the face of increas-
ing social and political recognition of women's civic functions. In Frontiero v.
Richardson,88 Justice Brennan concluded that "classifications based upon sex,
like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently
suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." 89 Of
course, Justice Brennan's opinion in Frontiero, which did not garner a majority
of votes, did not stand the test of time.
After struggling with the appropriate level of scrutiny for sex discrimina-
tion cases, the Court adopted a middle ground. As stated by Justice Ginsburg in
United States v. Virginia,9" intermediate scrutiny requires the "State [to] show
84. Another possible interpretation is that the Court does not consider homosexuals to owe the same
civic functions as other citizens and individuals. By way of comparison, under Cleburne it might be ar-
gued that the lack of any substantial scrutiny on the part of the Court for classifications relating to men-
tal soundness is due to the lack of similar civic functions expected of the mentally impaired as compared
to other individuals. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
85. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874).
86. Cf Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (approving of a law prohibiting certain nighttime
work); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (upholding a law setting maximum work hours for
women on the grounds that they are more physically suited to such things as "the performance of mater-
nal functions," which places them "at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence," and therefore need
special "protection"). The modem Court has criticized this approach. See United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 550 (1996) ("[G]eneralizations about 'the way women are,' estimates of what is appropriate
for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them
outside the average description.").
87. For instance, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994), forbidding pay dis-
crimination on the basis of sex, embodies the political view that women could and ought to be produc-
tive in the marketplace, and thus their means of performing such a civic function ought not be compro-
mised. See also Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. 7, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (disapproving of
sex discrimination in certain contexts).
88. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
89. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J.) (emphasis added).
90. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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at least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objec-
tives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives."
91
The negligence model suggests that this shift in scrutiny over time reflects
an increased awareness of the civic functions that women perform and thus the
foreseeability of harm to the means of performing them. The jurisprudence sur-
rounding this particular shift in foreseeability reflects two points of interest re-
garding the negligence model. First, the Court's attempts to redefine the scope
of the duty by applying a new level of scrutiny may require some fumbling and
experimentation, as evidenced by the Court's plurality opinion in Frontiero and
subsequent failure to follow Justice Brennan's application of strict scrutiny.
9
2
Second, the Court's acknowledgement of changed foreseeability may lag be-
hind changed norms. In the case of women, the Court took a considerable
amount of time to acknowledge the heightened level of civic functions women
perform. Moreover, of considerable interest, the negligence model may suggest
that perhaps, by currently standing in a middle ground, the Court's jurispru-
dence in this regard is still evolving as women are recognized to carry on
greater and greater levels of such civic functions, in both political and social
contexts.
IV. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Much as with equal protection jurisprudence, "courts [have traditionally
been viewed as using] the concept of substantive due process to review the
ability of government to restrict the freedom of action (regarding life, liberty, or
property) of all persons. ' 93 Yet a restriction of a freedom is no more than a
breach of the duty that grounds the freedom. 94 Thus, we must again resort to
duty talk to fully comprehend the Court's due process jurisprudence, making
the negligence model a wonderfully appropriate lens through which to under-
stand the doctrine.
Since substantive due process talk generally brings thoughts of judicial ac-
tivism and the Lochner95 era, I begin with language from a case decided by the
91. Id. at 533 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court adopted the intermediate scrutiny test twenty
years before United States v. Virginia. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (adopting intermediate
scrutiny for the first time). Craig involved a state law that prohibited the sale of certain beer to men less
than twenty-one years of age and women under eighteen. The statute was challenged on equal protec-
tion grounds. The Court fashioned the intermediate scrutiny test to strike down the statute. The Court's
adoption of intermediate scrutiny for sex discrimination cases in a case brought by a man is certainly
noteworthy. However, the potentially anomalous nature of this circumstance is mitigated by the fact that
the Court began contemplating forms of heightened scrutiny for sex discrimination in Frontiero.
92. Supra text accompanying notes 888-899.
93. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 382 (5th ed. 1995) (empha-
sis added).
94. Gardner, supra note 21, at I11.
95. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a health statute under
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Lochner Court. Striking down a statute that required school teachers to teach
only in English, Meyer v. Nebraska96 states that the liberty protection embodied
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right.., to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men."97 In other words, the Due Process Clause was said to protect the
means of carrying out those activities (such as engaging in economically pro-
ductive work, raising a family, acquiring knowledge necessary to exercise po-
litical voice, etc.) essential to the fulfillment of the civic functions that support
a democratic society. Thus, due process analysis and the changes associated
therewith can be seen as inquiries into the foreseeability of harm to the means
of accomplishing such civic functions.
98
A. The Rise and Fall of Economic Due Process
The Lochner Court's activism has long since been abandoned, and under
the negligence model the question remains what changes in foreseeability are
attributable to this shift in attitude. Lochner itself, decided at the turn of the
twentieth century, promoted a laissez-faire theory of economics in its decision
to render the state powerless to regulate maximum workweek hours for bakers
and, by extension, to others. 99 In fact, "[i]n the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury, the Due Process Clause was wielded by the Court to strike down state
laws that, in its estimation, arbitrarily, unreasonably, and capriciously inter-
fered with the rights of life, liberty, and property."'00 It has been said that "[b]y
embracing the notion of substantive due process, the Lochner Court assumed
which a bakery proprietor had been convicted that limited the number of hours an employee could work
in a bakery). Lochner applied substantive economic due process in its prime, and the associated period
of court history is marked by judicial activism cloaked in substantive due process review.
96. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
97. Id. at 399 (emphasis added); see also Palko v. Connecticut 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (describ-
ing due process protection as a protection of those rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty");
Holden v. Hardy 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898) (describing protected due process rights as "certain immuta-
ble principles ofjustice which inhere in the very idea offree government which no member of the Union
may disregard") (emphasis added).
98. As it would be impossible to discuss any substantial number of the procedural and substantive
due process contexts in which the negligence model might shed considerable light in this Note, no such
attempt is made. One such context of particular interest involves prisoners' due process rights. Although
a thorough discussion simply cannot be undertaken in this Note, it is interesting that the Court has ap-
plied a significantly relaxed scrutiny in certain prison cases that deny that the negligence of government
actors resulting in bodily injury amounts to a deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty. See
Daniels v. Williams 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). Here, the negli-
gence model would suggest that the outcomes are consistent with the notion that we do not expect much
in the way of civic functions from prisoners, and thus foreseeability of harm is small.
99. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897) (invoking economic due process); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (utilizing economic
due process); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (invalidating a prohibition law on grounds that
it interfered with economic freedom).
100. RALPH A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE BILL OF
RIGHTS AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS 77 (5th ed. 1999).
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the very role that Justice Miller had warned against in The Slaughterhouse
Cases: it became a 'perpetual censor,' reviewing the reasonableness of state ef-
forts at economic regulation."' ' While these criticisms of the Court's activism
are easy to make ex post, one must remember the social and political context of
rapid industrial growth and the importance of free markets to that growth. It is
plausible that, taking personal contribution to the enhancement of efficient
markets as a civic function, significant and varied state-by-state economic regu-
lation could reasonably have been seen to pose a substantial risk to the exercise
of that civic function. The negligence model suggests that the Lochner Court
may not have been overly active in light of the norms at the time.
In any event, the Lochner approach has been abandoned in a time in which
efficient markets are well established. 10As we have seen in other contexts, the
negligence model suggests that the reason for this shift lies in the foreseeability
of risk of harm. In this case the change in foreseeability differs inasmuch as it
stems from a change in the underlying civic function itself. As efficient markets
in the United States have long been established and appear stronger than
ever, 10 3 the civic function of contributing to the creation and maintenance of
such markets by engaging in free contract, competitive work, and the like may
have lessened over time. Here again, norms inform foreseeability, and in this
case, duties owed by the citizenry (as opposed to duties owed by the govern-
ment) have changed.
B. Abortion
The abortion cases, and in particular Roe v. Wade
1°4 and Doe v. Bolton,10 5
are of particular analytical interest under a negligence model because they il-
luminate the dynamic nature of the relationship between norms and the fore-
seeability of constitutional harm. In holding on due process grounds that a
woman has a "fundamental rights" interest in the decision to terminate a preg-
nancy, the Court set forth a "definitive statement about abortion rights" rather
101. Id. at 84; see also The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (setting forth Jus-
tice Miller's warning).
102. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[R]egulatory legislation
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless ... it is of
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowl-
edge and experience of the legislators.").
103. For an illustration of lawmakers' increasing acceptance of the notion of efficient securities
markets, consider that the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 generally require disclosure of material in-
formation, a method of investor protection that cannot work effectively unless markets absorb that in-
formation efficiently. See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (2000); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-mm (2000). In fact, efficient markets have become so well-
established that the Supreme Court has relied on the efficient market hypothesis to adopt its fraud-on-
the-market theory of liability for certain securities law violations. See Zachary Shulman, Note, Fraud on
the Market Theory After Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 964, 965 (1989).
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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than "follow[ing] its own example in the contraception cases [by trying] to es-
tablish a dialogue with the legislatures" first.'0 6 In fact, when those decisions
came down,
[A]bortion law was already in a state of flux and change throughout the several
states of the nation. Liberalization of state abortion laws, as the Court's opinion [in
Roe], written by Justice Blackmun, recognized, had been well under way for some
time. However, a well-organized, highly vocal 'right-to-life' movement had begun
to succeed in either delaying or reversin that tide, and criminal abortion statutes
remained on the books 
of many a state.
Thus, given the social context-one of controversy and shifting tides-it is in-
triguing that the Court did in fact hand down a definitive statement rather than
engage in a dialogue with legislative bodies. As discussed below, this action
suggests that the definitive statement itself may be viewed as an attempt to
mold norms.108
Until now, we have observed the ways in which changing norms bring
about shifting duties of care by virtue of their influence over the foreseeability
of risks that might compromise certain classes' ability to perform civic func-
tions. In the case of abortion, we see exactly the opposite. Under a negligence
model interpretation, Roe asserts the foreseeability of potential harms to the
means of carrying out a woman's civic functions, whether they be performing
work in the economy, raising children in stable homes, or obtaining education
necessary to exercise a political voice. The Court finds that the foreseeability of
such harms is substantial enough to require a compelling state interest, which
the Court decides does not exist until the point of viability. 109 The Court's de-
finitive statement simply asserts the fact of foreseeability of constitutional harm
without addressing the complexity of the norms. This attempt to influence those
norms seems to have had some impact, as a woman's fundamental rights inter-
est in terminating an unwanted pregnancy becomes (at least debatably) more
and more rooted in privacy and due process jurisprudence, yet the lack of a
comprehensive and uniform rationale for the right may reflect the fact that the
issue of foreseeability as a matter of social norms remains controversial. 10
106. FARBER ET AL., supra note 46, at 500. See generally Poe v, Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)
(ducking the controversial contraception issue in favor of establishing a dialogue with legislative bodies
prior to rendering a definitive statement). The Court took up the contraception issue four years later in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a Connecticut anti-contraception statute uncon-
stitutionally overbroad).
107. ABRAHAM & PERRY, supra note 48, at 426.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 109-110.
109. I make no moral judgment in this Note about whether a pregnant woman ever has a civic func-
tion interest sufficient to justify extinguishing an unborn child's life. Rather, my purpose in discussing
this topic is merely to address a case that illustrates the tension that arises when the Court moves for-
ward in the face of society's normative uncertainty.
110. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (recog-
nizing the stability of the right, yet evidencing considerable difference of opinion as to rationale among
the Justices, particularly with respect to the trimester system set forth in Roe). Many scholars seem to
disagree that the right to abortion has become rooted in the Court's privacy and due process jurispru-
dence, noting that the past thirty years have marked a retreat from Roe. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger &
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Whatever the case, the abortion cases are analytically intriguing inasmuch as
they reflect the dynamic interaction of norms, foreseeability of constitutional
harms, and definitive statements by the Court in the face of tremendous norma-
tive uncertainty.
V. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
While elaborate analysis of free speech problems arising under the negli-
gence model is beyond the scope of this Note, the following discussion
sketches the contours of a negligence model of free speech jurisprudence. After
identifying the ways in which free speech cases stray from duty of care reason-
ing, a theoretical reconciliation of the apparent divergence is offered. The dis-
cussion then turns to the application of the negligence model to two obscenity
cases that illustrate the propositions of the theoretical argument.
Upon initial inspection, the free speech line of cases seems to stray from the
duty of reasonable care analysis because it demonstrates a strong presumption
of unconstitutionality for obstruction of speech that is often not related to any
civic function. For example, burning an American flag can hardly be seen as an
obligation or civic duty of any sort, but the Court held that such conduct was
"sufficiently imbued with elements of communication" and could not be pro-
hibited by the state, concluding that "government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive."'11 With
respect to additional forms of speech and expressive conduct that appear far
removed from civic functions, the Court has found that an underinclusive pro-
hibition on hate speech is unconstitutional because it constitutes viewpoint dis-
crimination," that libel against a public figure is not actionable without a
showing of actual malice,' 13 and has generally set a difficult standard for show-
ing that expression is obscene (and thereby exempted from First Amendment
protection).11 4 In sum, the free speech cases pose difficult problems for the neg-
Gene B. Sperling, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Re-
treat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83, 83 (1989) (suggesting that the Court has retreated so far
as to divest the right to abortion of fundamental right status). While the retreat is undeniable, the exis-
tence of a right to abortion for the past thirty years has caused the concept of such a right to take root as
an integral part of judicial doctrine. E.g. Casey, 505 U.S. at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (suggesting that Roe has become "an integral part" of the Court's jurisprudence). I do
not, however, mean to in any way assert that the "rootedness" of the abortion right is a good thing.
11. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 414 (1989) (internal citation omitted).
112. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
113. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (defining a statement made with "actual malice" to be a statement made
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").
114. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth the test under which regu-
lation of obscenity must be limited to "works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in
sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" when viewed from the perspective of "the average
person, applying contemporary [local] community standards") (internal citations omitted); see also Roth
v. United States 354 U.S. 476, 488, 498 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not protected by the First
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ligence model as it has been discussed thus far in this Note.
However, the free speech line of cases can be reconciled with the duty of
care analysis by analogizing free speech jurisprudence to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in tort law. Res ipsa loquitur is applied in tort suits where the fact
of a particular injury (being struck by a barrel, for example) in and of itself
suggests that the harm was caused by a particular party's negligence (in the
case of barrels stored in a warehouse, the negligence of the warehouse owner in
handling the barrels). 115 Similarly, because free speech is so vital to the per-
formance of civic functions, 116 even to the point that the freedom of speech
may itself be considered a definitional element of "democratic America,"'
1 7
any governmental action that abridges the right to free speech may presump-
tively be considered a breach of the government's duty to protect the means for
performing individual civic functions. In a sense, abridgement of speech does
not ordinarily occur without the breach of the government's duty of care, and
thus such an abridgement cannot typically be said to be beyond the scope of
reasonably foreseeable harm (defined as an inappropriate compromise in the
means of performing civic functions). In essence, the abridgement itself makes
out a prima facie case for unconstitutionality.'1 8 The government can save a
statute that infringes on free speech only by showing that the statute does not,
and could not, interfere with the exercise of civic functions tied to free speech.
Thus, the Court allows for abridgment of obscene material, libel with reckless
disregard for the truth, and hate speech, but not without a rebuttal of the pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality by the government.
Obscenity cases in particular illuminate the burden-shifting feature of free
speech jurisprudence that resembles res ipsa loquitur. With respect to obscene
material, the Miller v. California standard demonstrates the burden on govern-
ment to rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality. 19 To successfully invade
an individual's speech rights on obscenity grounds, the government must con-
vince the trier of fact "applying contemporary community standards" that the
Amendment, but rejecting the "tend[s] to deprave or corrupt its [audience]" test, under which any mate-
rial that appeals predominantly to "prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion" would fall outside of the scope of First Amendment protection) (internal citation omitted).
115. See Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
116. See, e.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 301-02
(1941) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Freedom to speak and write about public questions is as important to the
life of our government as is the heart to the human body. In fact, this privilege is the heart of our gov-
ernment. If that heart be weakened, the result is debilitation; if it be stilled, the result is death."); Whit-
ney v. California 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, J.J., concurring) (stating that "public
discussion is a political duty").
117. ABRAHAM & PERRY, supra note 48, at 153 ("[The] underlying philosophy [of free speech] is
ingrained in the body politic's notion of what democratic America means.").
118. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965) ("It may be inferred that harm... is
caused by negligence of the defendant [if the type of harm] ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
negligence[, and, among other things,] the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's
duty to the plaintiff.") (setting forth a concise statement of res ipsa loquitur).
119. 413 U.S. at24..
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sexual material is "patently offensive" and "lacks serious literary, artistic, po-
litical, or scientific value."' 20 This standard resembles res ipsa loquitur inas-
much as it reveals the Court's tendency to find that the risk of harm to the
means of exercising civic functions in prohibiting speech is reasonably foresee-
able and, therefore, makes out a prima facie case. It is also significant that the
Court emphasizes contemporary standards for permitting the invasion of speech
rights. Although common sense suggests the need for such a standard apart
from the negligence model, one of the negligence model's goals is to explain
why it might make sense to some in a duty model to permit evolving standards
over time. 12 The contemporary community standard might then be seen as a
reflection of the Court's perception of frequent and identifiable variations in the
scope of the government's duty to protect against foreseeable harms to the free
speech means of performing civic functions. This is particularly plausible when
one realizes that the Court's standard accounts for variations in the strength of
the speech right (which is a mirror of the duty owed) across spectrums of time
and of local communities (which are themselves classes).
Another important obscenity case is Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton,122 in
which the Court rejected the notion that consenting adults have a First Amend-
ment right to purchase obscene material. The Court permitted a state legislature
to assume that such materials were harmful to the public on the basis of "[t]he
sum of experience," even in the absence of "conclusive evidence or empirical
data." 123 This position is a relaxed standard in terms of the findings required
prior to legislative action, particularly in the context of such fundamental rights
as free speech. However, the relaxed standard makes perfect sense upon recog-
nition that the purchase of obscene materials is counterproductive to contempo-
rary notions of performing civic functions. In fact, as the Court notes, "there is
at least an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime. 1 24 Thus,
the negligence model suggests that, in the context of genuinely obscene mate-
rial, virtually no significant duty should rest upon government to protect such
"speech" precisely because no harm to means of performing civic functions is
reasonably foreseeable, the absolute language of the right itself notwithstand-
ing.125 Even in cases where this absence of risk to the exercise of civic func-
tions is less clear, the foregoing discussion illustrates that the free speech line
of cases can be understood in a negligence model context by analogizing to res
ipsa loquitur.
120. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
122. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
123. Id. at 63.
124. Id. at 58.
125. See U.S. CONST., amend. I.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The civic function analysis of the rights of citizenship provides a solid un-
derstanding of those rights themselves and of the duties and obligations owed
by the government to its citizens. The negligence model also explains the
Court's departure from the absolute commands of the Constitution by allowing
abridgement of rights in appropriate cases. One wonders if the same might be
achieved by adhering to the seemingly explicit absolute commands of the Con-
stitution, but permitting the Court some leeway in characterizing the rights spe-
cifically in terms of the civic functions that define them. This approach may ac-
count for changes over time that amend or create functions of citizenship and
harmonize the Court's individual rights jurisprudence, under which it must cur-
rently apply varying levels of scrutiny to obtain the same result (or so would
suggest the negligence model).
In any case, the negligence model provides a new perspective from which
to view individual rights problems, explain seeming inconsistencies in current
jurisprudence, and advocate for reform. Although the model itself involves
malleable standards, it makes the underlying assumptions-such as expecta-
tions of performance of civic functions among classes and views on foresee-
ability of harm-clear and arrives at a logically forced conclusion based on
those assumptions. This model provides a means of incorporating various doc-
trines into a common framework without resorting directly to speculation about
judges' and courts' ideological views and activist application of those views in
arriving at an outcome. Although such views certainly inform the underlying
assumptions about civic functions of classes and the foreseeability of risk to the
means of performing those functions, those assumptions must be made clear in
order to proper apply the negligence model. The negligence model is thus a
helpful scholarly tool for understanding and critiquing doctrines.

